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 Abstract 
This paper is an attempt to identify which factors influence Portuguese local 
governments to rely on municipal corporations to provide public services. Based on the 
ideas of the new institutional economics applied to public administration developed by 
Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Horn (1995), we argue that influence costs of in-house 
production and bargaining costs of external delegation to municipal enterprises are the 
main determinants of the creation of municipal corporations and other types of local 
public sector organizations external to the local government. An event count model is 
employed to explain the differences across 278 Portuguese local governments in 
adopting municipal corporations/enterprises. Results indicate that organizational size, 
financial dependency, and fiscal stress, as well as ideological concerns and the activity 
of local interest groups drive the choices of local governance structures.  
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Introduction 
In the last five years Portugal has witnessed the expansion of new forms of local 
governance, mainly due to the enactment of the Municipal, Intermunicipal and Regional 
Corporations Act of 19981. According to official data, 269 of 308 Portuguese local 
governments (approximately 88%) have invested capital in public and private 
corporations. The increase of these forms of governance has occurred through the 
accelerated growth of the local corporate public sector (CPS)2 demonstrated by the 
increase in number of municipal corporations from 34 in 1999 to 114 in 2001 and stock 
companies with connections to local governments from 143 (1999) to 187 (2001) 
(Almeida, 2001). 
In Portugal, it is generally believed that these new forms of local governance are 
the result of an attempt to improve municipal management and circumvent 
administrative law and its implications for personnel management, contract agreements 
and organization. Rigorous controls imposed by institutions such as the Accounting 
Court (Tribunal de Contas3), the General Inspection of Territorial Administration 
(Inspecção Geral da Administração do Território) and the General Inspection of 
Finances (Inspecção Geral de Finanças), as well as the demands of public 
administrative law are avoided by these new forms of governance, even though this 
does not mean the complete subordination to labour law (Oliveira, 2001).  
This paper is the first attempt to identify which factors influence Portuguese 
local governments to rely on municipal corporations to provide public services. The 
proliferation of corporations with local governmental capital in the last five years has 
                                                 
1 Lei nº58/98: Lei das Empresas Municipais, Intermunicipais e Regionais.  
2 The local corporate public sector includes all forms of organizations involving a majority of public 
capital. 
3 Judicial branch organization that inspects and evaluates the legality and conformity of public budgeting 
and spending practices producing decisions valid for all public organizations. 
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led us to question the reasons for this significant growth. In other words, since the 
delegation of authority by local officials is inevitable, the question becomes which 
public governance structure is preferred – internal production using public bureaus or 
external delivery employing a CPS type of organization?   
First, we discuss the alternative institutional arrangements of public service 
provision at the disposal of Portuguese local governments. Next, we explore the 
motivations for the provision of services by municipal corporations by highlighting the 
internal costs of delegation to civil servants. Third, we present the transaction costs 
involved in providing services using the local corporate public sector and some of the 
possible explanations for why some municipalities may shy away from using these 
types of organizations for service delivery. The fourth section discusses the hypotheses 
and describes the variables employed in the empirical analysis conducted in section 
five. We close with a short set of conclusions and directions for future research. 
 
Transaction Costs, Institutional Arrangements and Local Service Delivery 
 The literature on new institutional economics and rational choice theory has 
explored at length the role played by transaction costs in institutional design and choice 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Miller, 1992; Horn, 1995; Goodin, 1998; Epstein and 
O’Halloran, 1999). At the local level, the empirical work has employed the transaction 
costs framework both to explain contracting and sector choice decisions (Clingermayer 
and Feiock, 2001; Nelson, 1997; Ashton, 1998) and service delivery performance 
(Brown and Potoski, 2003). 
 Much emphasis of these analyses has been placed upon the public-private sector 
choice, but a lot less attention has been devoted to the choice to provide local services 
through different governance structures within the public sector. Murray Horn (1995) 
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presents a theoretical discussion of the choice of public enterprises and public bureaus 
as alternative ways of providing local government services. The practice demonstrates, 
however, that the choice between these governance structures is less a dichotomy and 
more a continuum. In Portugal, the local corporate public sector is composed of several 
forms of public and public-private arrangements including municipal corporations, 
stock companies with public capital, public foundations, and cooperatives. The share of 
public funds invested varies from one form to another, but all these display at least fifty 
percent of public capital as the initial investment.  
The decision to provide a service through the public sector predates the choice of 
governance structure within the public sector. The transaction costs framework allows 
us to develop “…falsifiable predictions about institutional choice” (Horn, 1995: 13), 
and helps us clarify the choice between public enterprise and public bureau. Although 
this is our main focus, we will address, whenever appropriate, the slight variations 
among the different governance structures, which characterize the Portuguese local 
corporate public sector. 
 
Delegation of Authority and Service Delivery Choice 
The literature on new institutional economics provides an explanation for the 
option between direct provision by the municipality and the creation of a separate public 
corporation to provide the service. The institutional arrangements of public service 
provision can be extremely diverse (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1977; Ostrom, 1983; Smith, 
1996). It is possible to organize the options available to local governments in three 
groups: 1) Direct provision of the service by the municipality; 2) Adoption of one of the 
public organizational forms included in the CPS; and 3) Contracting with a private 
business firm. Here, our concern is not with the third option, which involves 
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privatisation decisions generally absent at the local level in Portugal. More specifically, 
we are interested in the “make or buy in a public sector organization” decision.  
The option between providing a service directly by the local government or 
delegate this task to another public organization is a decision which depends on 
institutional, legal and economic factors, including the costs of direct provision of the 
service, the influence costs resulting from hierarchical centralization of authority, and 
the negotiation and monitoring costs of contracting with an external provider, the 
protection against uncertainty present in the political arena, and the protection of social 
values such as justice, equity, and the public interest (McGuire, Ohsfeldt and Van Cott, 
1987 Donahue, 1989; Smith, 1996). 
Public bureaus are primarily tax- financed, compete with each other for budget 
allocations, and are more dependent of political “interference”. In contrast, public 
enterprises are governed by a board presided by a CEO, have larger managerial 
discretion in administrative and personnel decisions, avoid limits on public borrowing, 
and are mainly self-financed. Still, according to Horn (1995), the distinction between 
public bureaus and public enterprises is less clear when the later run large and persistent 
deficits, forcing local officials to finance the losses with budget allocations.   
Public provision of municipal services always involves delegation of authority. 
If a municipality produces the service directly, the delegation of authority is internal and 
the costs incurred can be aggregated under the bureaucratic failure umbrella. When the 
service is produced by a public organization, the delegation of authority is external, and 
contracting costs will be present. Both alternatives entail costs that go beyond 
production costs, mainly due to a monopoly context. In the case of municipal 
production, the public bureaucracy holds the monopoly, whereas when the service is 
externally produced the situation can be best described as a bilateral monopoly, with the 
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municipal corporation retaining the monopoly of service production and the local 
government the monopoly of service provision. 
If all services provided by the municipality are produced in-house, transaction 
costs resulting from contract failure are absent. All inefficiencies will be the result of 
bureaucratic monopoly. Once local government officials sponsor the creation of 
municipal corporations to provide specialized services (solid waste collection, water 
distribution, parks and landscape maintenance, sewage collection and treatment, among 
many others), external costs increase sharply, essentially due to bargaining and 
monitoring costs involved in the contract with the external producer. Brown and Potoski 
(2003) correctly argue that governments that contracts with monopoly producers are 
less able to negotiate contractual features. 
The choice of the governance structure made by elected officials aims at 
minimizing political transaction costs associated with policy implementation, but the 
consequences of choice and implementation cannot be fully anticipated. In other words, 
the individuals act in ways intendedly rational, while subjected to uncertainty 
(Williamson, 1988; Horn, 1995). Alternatives become more attractive as they increase 
the chances of re-election of local officials. 
 
Bureaucratic Supply, Delegation, and Influence Costs 
Traditionally, local governments prefer direct production of services that the 
market is unable or unwilling to produce and/or provide. The maintenance of public 
parks, the regulation of medical drugs, the control of pollution, or road works are 
examples of services the market fails to produce in efficient quantities and that, 
therefore, become central or local government responsibility. The hierarchy, opposed to 
the market, is more efficacious in the pursuit of these goals.  
 
The lack of flexibility of public service law in Portugal is usually mentioned as 
an obstacle to efficient management. However, this rigidity is justified as a means to 
guarantee the continuity and political neutrality of public servants, even if it entails 
inefficient behaviours. 
In-house organization of service delivery allows municipal governments to save 
on bargaining costs, since the relationship between local governments and municipal 
corporations is, in essence, a bilateral monopoly, leading to inefficient outcomes due to 
asset specificity. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) point out that, in situations such as the 
one described, bargaining costs result from coordination failure between the purchaser 
(the local government) and the supplier (the municipal corporation) and from 
measurement costs derived from information acquisition in search of performance 
quality. 
However, the savings in bargaining costs produced by in-house production have 
a downside: influence costs increase sharply, as a consequence of centralized authority. 
When the service is provided in-house, it shares the municipal resources and budget 
allocations with all the other services. This leads to competition between services over 
limited amounts of resources, entailing four kinds of influence costs: 1) excessive 
intervention due to over-zealous authority and/or personal interest; 2) increased time 
dedicated by the middle and lower ranks to influence decision-making resulting in 
reduced organizational productivity; 3) poor decision-making due to information 
distortion and asymmetry and; 4) inefficiency generated by structural modifications to 
avoid influence costs (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990).   
The literature on principal-agent theory argues that the internal production of 
publicly provided services involves delegation from the mayor or municipal council to 
the bureaucrats or administrative ranks, acting as agents. Bureaucrats have a better 
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understanding of the minimum cost of service production and ask for a higher budget 
than their needs – the discretionary budget (Niskanen, 1971) and can engage in on-the-
job shirking due to the lack of flexibility of civil service laws barring effective 
personnel management. These practices are the product of information asymmetry 
between elected local officials and administrative employees and result in internal 
delegation costs and inefficiencies. 
However, the concept of influence costs goes beyond Horn’s definition of 
agency costs and Niskanen’s discretionary budget, to encompass a larger number of in-
house provision inefficiencies. Larger municipalities face more severe influence costs. 
As the number and diversity of services to be provided increases, influence costs may 
rise sharply due to the multiplication of the number of employees and organizational 
hierarchical levels. In this context, local officials will frequently opt for municipal 
corporations to deliver local services, even if this results in organizational redundancy 
or duplication (Bendor, 1985; Miranda and Lerner, 1995). 
Municipal corporations help to reduce influence costs in a significant way, 
because they insulate the provision of specific services from the competition for 
resources and budgets, reduce the number of transfers between services, and stimulate 
each corporation to search for own revenues. In addition, local bureaucracies are much 
more subjected to influence costs than municipal corporations because local officials 
have to periodically stand for election (Clingermayer and Feiock, 2001). There are, of 
course, inefficiencies associated with the creation of these entities, mainly as a result of 
bargaining and monitoring costs, but these have to be compared with the influence costs 
avoided with the restructuring of service delivery. After discussing influence costs 
present in local bureaucracies, we now turn to bargaining costs associated with external 
service delivery. 
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 External Service Delivery and Contractual Costs 
In general, the adoption of new forms of governance of public services is 
associated with a need by municipalities to avoid public expenditure legal limitations 
and circumvent the lack of flexibility in civil service management. The creation of 
municipal corporations requires the authorization of the municipal assembly and is 
subjected to ex-post control (fiscalização sucessiva) by the Accounting Court. Other 
than these requirements, all municipal corporations are characterized by high flexibility 
of organization and have greater discretion to enter in contracts with other public or 
private organizations. The option for the creation of a municipal enterprise seems to be 
linked with the attempt to take advantage of flexible financial and personnel controls, 
the specialization of services, economies of scale, and intermunicipal synergies (CCRN, 
1998). The adoption of municipal corporations also allows municipalities to avoid 
situations where the market fails, such as the outsourcing of companies in monopolist or 
oligopolist markets. 
The delegation of authority to a public organization entails both economic and 
political efficiency arguments. Economically, external service delivery is likely to 
produce savings as a result of flexible personnel management and procurement rules.  
When the delegation is made to municipal corporations, the civil service rules and 
regulations no longer apply and the governance structure is, at least in theory, 
dominated by criteria of economic efficiency.  
The choice of service delivery mode is also the result of political preferences and 
the distributive consequences of each governance structure (Moe, 1984). Political 
efficiency is then measured in terms of the probability of re-election. Elected officials 
will choose the governance structure that maximizes the probability of re-election 
 10
(minimizes political transaction costs), independently of the consequences in terms of 
economic efficiency. 
Delegating the decision to other public organizations involves a larger number of 
actors and decision-making points and, therefore, opportunities for delays and other 
costs. As Pressman and Wildavski (1979) suggested, as the number of veto points 
increases, the probability of success in policy implementation decreases and the conflict 
over the means employed in service provision increases. For this reason, the elected 
officials will choose external service delivery when the external costs of transaction 
(delegation to municipal corporations) are lower than the internal costs of delegation, 
i.e., direct provision by the municipality (Coase, 1960; Donahue, 1989; Dasse et. al., 
2000; Moe, 1984, 1989, 1990; Williamson, 1988, 1990; Nelson, 1997). 
Any alternative scheme of production that involves a contract of the 
municipality with another entity involves bargaining and monitoring costs not present in 
direct provision. The decision to provide the service externally through a municipal 
enterprise is likely to increase management flexibility and significantly reduce influence 
costs, although often counterbalanced by the loss of control by local officials.  
However, the degree to which influence costs are reduced depends upon a strict 
financial independence between municipal government and municipal enterprise. In 
other words, when the legal limits to debt in municipal corporations are nonexistent and 
the contract between the local government and the municipal enterprise is incomplete, 
bargaining costs rise sharply, mainly due to the breach of the boundary between both 
organizations. Municipal corporations surpluses may be employed to cover municipal 
budget losses and municipal revenues can be used to bail out enterprise losses. In these 
cases, bargaining costs become true influence costs, since the boundary between both 
organizations is blurred and what previously were contracting costs resulting from the 
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negotiation between separate organizations become influence costs within a single 
organization with several financial flows and transfers. 
In the Portuguese case, the leadership of municipal corporations has been linked 
with the local elected leaders, with the mayor frequently becoming the CEO of the 
corporation. The existence of vague legislation favours the establishment of these 
organizations at the local level circumventing the legislation. In this context, the central 
government has a limited number of instruments to monitor municipalities; individual 
monitoring activities are too expensive and a single monitoring strategy may be 
inadequate to the diversity of situations. As a result, in a situation of public monopoly, 
municipal elected officials are relatively free to choose the governance structure of 
service delivery that enhances political efficiency, translated in electoral gains. 
  
Hypotheses and Variables 
The previous section shows that the transaction costs framework enables us to 
analyse theoretically the choices of governance structure in Portuguese municipalities.  
Our aim is not only to develop theoretical arguments but also to actually test them 
empirically. This objective presupposes the development of testable hypotheses. As 
always, an empirical test is constrained by practical concerns with data availability.   
Theoretically, it would be possible for municipalities to retain internal control 
over all public service production. However, resource and organizational limitations 
entailing significant influence costs force delegation of activities to a greater or lesser 
extent to external providers. The size of the local bureaucracy is a reliable indicator of 
the amount of influence costs faced by local officials. If the number of local government 
employees is large, influence costs will be high, leading local officials to opt for the 
creation of municipal enterprises to reduce them. The formation of specialized 
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municipal corporations then is likely to reduce influence costs generated by excessive 
organizational complexity and size of traditional municipal services. 
In municipalities characterized by large population growth, the need for 
delegation will be higher, not only because the pressures for the municipality to provide 
a larger amount and diversity of services is higher and fiscal stress more likely to occur, 
but also because interest groups will be more active and in larger number in calling for 
specific services.  
The motivation behind this option of service delivery is that when public service 
demand increases, the response of the municipality may become inadequate due to the 
size and complexity of internal organization. Population growth can also be seen as a 
proxy of service demand, that is, how heterogeneous are the community’s preferences. 
Population growth is measured as the rate of population change over the last ten years. 
The index of social development is included as a control variable for the socio-
economic conditions prevailing in the municipality. 
Fragmentation in the municipality is likely to increase the number of municipal 
corporations, because each parish4 operates as an interest group, lobbying the municipal 
government for more and better services. A large number of parishes is also a good 
proxy for the heterogeneity of preferences at the local level. Special purpose municipal 
corporations may be better equipped to deal with heterogeneous service demands and 
preferences (Nelson, 1997; Foster, 1996). The area of the municipality is measured in 
squared kilometres and is used as a control for our fragmentation variable.  
The creation of municipal corporations can also be driven by an ideological 
conception of municipal service delivery. The most representative political parties in 
                                                 
4 The smallest territorial unit with self-government in Portugal, with a low number of competences and 
heavily financially dependent of the municipal government; the lower tier of government. 
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Portugal cover the political spectrum from the left to the right5 and it is expected that 
municipalities with governments on the right or leaning towards the right will be more 
supportive of the creation of municipal corporations. Although the Parties on the right 
are inclined to favour privatisation or contracting out of private firms to deliver 
municipal services, they may not be able to convince the electorate to accept such a 
radical solution, given the Portuguese tradition of public bureaucratic production and 
provision of municipal services. In this context, public municipal corporations are a 
middle of the road strategy to move municipalities away from in-house production. 
In addition to the party ideology measure, we employ a dichotomous variable 
identifying a single party majority in the executive body of the municipality. It is 
expected that the presence of a majority will increase the number of municipal 
corporations, essentially because decision-making costs in the executive body are 
substantially reduced (Horn, 1995). When a single party holds the majority, veto points 
in the executive are absent and decisions are not constrained by the opposing parties. In 
this context, it is more likely that delegation to the local corporate public sector will 
occur. 
In Portugal, local revenues consist of two large parcels: revenue from local taxes 
and central government grants. Financial dependency from the central government is the 
proportion of central government grants over total municipal revenues. When financial 
dependency is high, the discretion of local governments in the creation of municipal 
corporations is smaller, especially because an analysis of financial dependency data 
reveals that dependency is higher in less populated municipalities, which also happen to 
have, on average, less municipal enterprises. Hence, local governments where local 
                                                 
5 The four major parties in the Portuguese political system are the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) 
coded “0” on the left, the Socialist Party coded “1” center-left, the Social Democratic Party (PSD) coded 
“2”, center-right, and the Christian-Democratic Party/Popular Party coded “3” on the right. The parties 
close to the center of the political spectrum have alternated in the National Government for the last 18 
years and control about 82,7 per cent of all municipal governments.  
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taxes represent a larger share of total revenues are expected to display larger numbers of 
municipal corporations. 
If the financial conditions are adverse (high deficits), municipalities avoid the 
creation of municipal enterprises, apparently because these drain resources from the 
general fund (Rubin, 1988). The empirical literature suggests that fiscal stress reduces 
contracting-out for service delivery with private organizations (Ferris, 1986), but 
increases the formation of public municipal enterprises (Rubin, 1988). In order to 
capture fiscal stress in the municipality, we employ the total deficit, measured as the 
difference between total revenues and total expenditures. The larger the deficit, the less 
likely municipal corporations will be created. 
To sum up, Table 1 summarizes the hypotheses and variables described above 
and their expected effects.  It also presents a brief definition and measurement of each 
variable, as well as the data source. In addition, Table 2 shows the summary statistics 
for the variables used in the analysis.  
 
[Insert Table 1 and Table 2] 
 
 
Empirical Analysis 
The empirical analysis of the hypotheses presented in the previous section 
involves the use of two different but related dependent variables. The first is the total 
number of the various Corporate Public Sector Organizations (with more than 50% of 
public capital) created in the 1999-2002 period. This is a count variable and reflects the 
intensity of choice. The second dependent variable is a dichotomous variable to measure 
the choice to create Municipal Corporations only. As we saw before, municipal 
corporations are just one specific type of CPS of organization, although it is by far the 
most frequently adopted.    
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In the first analysis, we use the Poisson regression model. This is the appropriate 
estimation technique to treat event counts as in this case, since the major assumption is 
that the conditional mean of the distribution equals the conditional variance 
(equidispersion). However, we are aware that more often than not, the variance exceeds 
the mean (overdispersion) so that the Poisson model is no longer adequate.  Then, the 
first step in determining the appropriateness of this model is to test for overdispersion 
(Long, 1997; Green, 1997). The goodness-of-fit χ2 test does not allow us to reject the 
null hypothesis that the data are Poisson distributed, so a Poisson regression model is 
used in the estimation. The Poisson regression results are presented in table 3.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
 
The likelihood ratio test based on a chi-square distribution compares the log 
likelihood of the unconstrained model with the log likelihood of a model only with the 
constant. If the constraint significantly reduces the likelihood, the null hypothesis is 
rejected (Long, 1997). The likelihood ratio for this model is statistically significant 
providing the indication that the full model is adequate. The pseudo-R2 should be 
carefully interpreted, since the usual interpretation – the proportion of the variation in 
the dependent variable explained by the independent variables – is not fully satisfactory. 
Long (1997) advises that large values are, obviously, better than lower values, but there 
is no clear cut criterion to judge the value of 23,3% obtained for our estimated model.  
In more substantive terms, the results provide general support for the hypotheses 
we developed in the previous sections.  Concerning the political variables, the ideology 
of the party governing the municipality matters.  The analysis gives support to the idea 
that a right-leaning composition of the local council increases the probability of using a 
larger number of external delivery governance structures such as municipal 
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corporations.  Therefore it stands the argument that rightist parties use public municipal 
corporations as a middle road strategy to move away from in-house production.    
Turning to hypotheses essentially derived from the transaction costs approach, 
the hypothesis regarding the effect of influence costs is strongly supported.  This means 
that as the organizational complexity increases (hierarchical levels and number of 
actors) so do the benefits of turning to external delivery.   
The variable measuring number of parishes in the municipality is also supported, 
which suggests that more fragmentation means more interest groups lobbying the 
municipal government for more and better services.  In this sense, the obvious rational 
strategy to avoid it is to rely on organizational structures that are, in fact, much more 
insulated from these political demands.  
 The three public finance variables are supported with high statistical 
significance and virtually robust to every modelling specification.  Budgetary 
limitations are an evident concern in the decision. That is, fiscal crises (budgetary 
deficits) constrain local decision-makers to rely more on in-house, thus more 
controllable, delivery of local public services. In the same way, tax limitation and 
financial dependency concerns also seem to influence local governance choices.  The 
more the municipalities are able to raise own sources of financing – and, symmetrically, 
the less they are financially dependent – the more they rely on alternative organization 
structures for delivering services.     
To advance a step further, Table 4 shows the computation of what Scott Long 
(1997) calls factor changes.  They are derived from the Poisson regression model shown 
in Table 3.  Simply put, a factor change means that, holding all variables constant, for a 
unit change in a given independent variable Xk, the output count changes by a factor of 
exp(Bk) (Long 1997: 225).  This factor has an important advantage when it comes to 
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interpret the results.  Contrary to what happens with the standard Poisson coefficients, 
the factor changes do not depend on the level of the variable of interest or all other 
variables in the model.     
 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
 
To illustrate, the factor change attached to the variable measuring party ideology 
is 1.1495.  This means that a change in the party securing local power to the party 
immediately on its right, is expected to increase, on average, the number of municipal 
corporations by 14.95%. Thus, the effect is strong and uniform in the entire ideological 
spectrum.  Similarly, holding all other variables constant, having one more parish in a 
municipality implies having about 1.13% more municipal enterprises in that given 
municipality.  It should also be obvious that a factor change of 0.24 of the financial 
dependency variable means a decrease. On average, it means the creation of less 76% 
municipal corporations for each unit increase in that variable.  
Turning to the second dependent variable, the results are less supportive of the 
suggested hypotheses.  Recall that this is a dichotomous variable to measure the mere 
choice to create the specific type of organization defined as Municipal Corporation.  As 
we saw in the previous sections, this type of organization has some common 
characteristics such as that they are governed by a board presided by a CEO, have larger 
managerial discretion in administrative and personnel decisions, avoid limits on public 
borrowing, and are mainly self-financed.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
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The results show nevertheless two important regularities. The hypothesis 
concerning the relevance of influence costs is, again, strongly supported. More 
importantly, these results are robust to many different specifications of the model6 and 
dependent variables collected from different sources. This means that organizational 
complexity (hierarchical levels and number of actors) is a strong determinant in the 
decision to rely on external sources of provision. This message seems to be clear.  
The second regularity relates to the number of parishes, seen as pressure groups 
demanding for more services to be delivered. Since it is also a good proxy for the 
heterogeneity of preferences at the local level, municipal corporations may be better 
equipped to deal with heterogeneous service demands and preferences (Nelson, 1997; 
Foster, 1996).  
 
Conclusions and Future Research 
The large number of municipal corporations and CPS organizations justifies an 
inquiry to the causes of their adoption. The different socio-economic and political 
characteristics of Portuguese local governments are relevant to explain the reasons for 
the delegation of authority from the municipalities to a set of public organizations (CPS) 
rather than in-house production. 
The size of the municipal government’s in-house production services generates 
extremely high influence costs, due to excessive centralization of authority. Influence 
costs are also present in municipal corporations, but the smaller size and lower 
complexity makes these costs more manageable at this level. Then, it seems clear that, 
when size and complexity of internal organization become a problem, local 
governments opt for a specialized organization for service delivery. As the empirical 
                                                 
6 The different specifications were not included here due to space limitations but they are available upon 
request.   
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analysis has shown, the heterogeneity of preferences of local citizens is an additional 
source of pressure for the creation of municipal corporations. 
Since this work is mainly focused on municipal corporations as a specific type of 
CPS organization, future research will further explore the choice among all types of 
organizations within the corporate public sector for municipal service delivery. Once 
data becomes available, we expect to develop hypotheses related to these choices in 
terms of specific services to be delivered. As the empirical literature has shown at 
length, the type of service to be delivered is linked with contracting and sector choice 
decisions (Clingermayer and Feiock, 2001; Dasse, Clingermayer and Feiock, 2000). 
The diversity of services provided by public corporations at the local level allows us to 
expect different patterns of choice of public governance structures.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1 – Variables Description, Expected Signs, and Sources 
Variable Description Expected Sign Source 
CPS Dependent Variable; the number of Corporate 
Public Sector Organizations with more than 50% 
of public capital created by 2001.  
 
 
Almeida (2001)
Mun Corporations Dependent Variable; Dichotomous variable to 
measure the choice to create Municipal 
Corporations only. 1 if one or more corporations 
were created and 0 if none was created. 
 Direct Survey 
to 
Municipalities 
PartyId Left-right ideological measure of the party 
securing the majority of the local council; PCP 
(left) coded as 0, PS (center-left) coded 1, PSD 
(center-right) coded 2, and PP (right) coded as 3. 
 
+ 
DGAL (2001) 
Majority Dummy variable which takes the value of “1” 
when the winning party has the majority of seats 
in the executive body. “0” otherwise.   
+ DGAL (2001) 
Bureaucracy The number of employees of the in-house 
municipal organization.  
+ 
 
Direct Survey 
to 
Municipalities 
Parishes Number of Parishes in the municipality.  + DGAL (2001) 
Pop. Growth  Variation in the population between two census.  + DGAL (2001) 
Area Area in squared kilometers + DGAL (2001) 
IDS Index of social development as measured by 
Portuguese government.  
+ DGAL (2001) 
Taxpc Local taxes per capita.  + DGAL (2001) 
Def Total local budgetary balance (a negative number 
is a deficit).  
+ DGAL (2001) 
FinDep Financial dependency, that is, the proportion of 
central grants in total local revenues.  
- DGAL (2001) 
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Table 2 – Summary of the Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CPS 278 2.9353 2.7592 0 22 
Mun Corporations 278 .3273 .4701 0 1 
PartyId 278 1.2986 .7510 0 3 
Majority  278 .8921 .3108 0 1 
Bureaucracy 276 399.5797 714.6057 46 10306 
Parishes 278 14.5216 12.7717 1 89 
Pop. Growth 278 .8000 12.2127 -19.22 78.06 
Area 278 319.0423 283.0178 7 1721 
IDS 278 .8456 .0457 .6392 .9347 
Taxpc 278 12.3871 13.0934 .3586 157.4417 
Def 278 - 64358.09 794486.4 - 1.28e+7 831195 
FinDep 278 0.4556 0.1705 .1007 .903 
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Table 3 – Results of the Poisson Regression Model 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. 
PartyId .1396*** .0534 
Majority  .0226 .1130 
Bureaucracy .0004*** .0001 
Parishes .0112*** .0026 
Pop. Growth .0025 .0031 
Area .0002 .0002 
IDS .8872 1.3151 
Taxpc .0099*** .0024 
Def 2.79e-07*** 5.05e-08 
FinDep -1.4096*** .3531 
Const .0954 1.2206 
   
Num Obs.  276  
LR chi2 (10) 304.03  
Prob > chi2 .0000  
Pseudo R2 .2338  
Log-L -498.2765  
  ***  significant at the level of .01   
   **    significant at the level of .05 
   *      significant at the level of .1 
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Table 4 – Factor Changes of the Poisson Regression Model 
Variable Factors Std. Err. 
PartyId 1.1495 .0614 
Majority  1.0228 .1156 
Bureaucracy 1.0004 .0001 
Parishes 1.0113 .0025 
Pop. Growth 1.0025 .0031 
Area 1.0002 .0002 
IDS 2.4284 3.1936 
Taxpc 1.0099 .0024 
Def 1 5.05e-08 
FinDep 0.2442 .0862 
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Table 5 – Results of the Logit Regression Model 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. 
PartyId .0322 .2136 
Majority  .9068* .5442 
Bureaucracy .0016** .0007 
Parishes .0254** .0129 
Pop. Growth -.0036 .0177 
Area .0013** .0006 
IDS 7.1952 5.1918 
Taxpc .0156 .0139 
Def -1.62e-07 7.28e-07 
FinDep -.4144 1.5845 
Const -9.0835* 4.8825 
   
Num Obs.  276  
LR chi2 (10) 55.69  
Prob > chi2 .0000  
Pseudo R2 .1591  
Log-L -147.1333  
  ***  significant at the level of .01   
   **    significant at the level of .05 
   *      significant at the level of .1 
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